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In 1934, Congress initially authorized the Supreme Court to for-
mally promulgate rules of evidence.1 For almost forty years, the
Supreme Court exercised that power without incident.2 There was an
excellent working relationship between Congress and the Court; and
Congress raised no objections when the Court released the Federal
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.3 Congress' acquiescence was
remarkable, since the Civil Rules in particular were highly innova-
tive.4 However, that working relationship suddenly broke down in
1973 when the Supreme Court approved the proposed Rules of Evi-
dence drafted by the Advisory Committee and transmitted them to
Congress.5 For the first time, Congress intervened and substantially
revised rules proposed by the Court.6
The congressional intervention was understandable. The Water-
gate affair was just beginning to unfold. 7 The affair not only made
Congress jealous of its prerogatives; Congress found itself battling the
President in the federal courts over claims of executive privilege.8 The
proposed Rules included Rule 509 regulating government privilege.9
In the words of the District of Columbia Conference Committee, Rule
509 proposed "a shockingly broad privilege."1o That rule provoked
more criticism than any other provision of the proposed rules.'1 The
1. Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 74, 76 (1974)[hereinafter Senate Hear-




5. The Chief Justice's communication transmitting the proposed Rules was dated
February 5, 1973. COMMUNICATION FROM TmE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRANSMITTING THE PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES [hereinafter COMMUNICATION], H.R. Doc. No. 46, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
6. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 76; 23 CiARLEs A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRA-
HAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5421, at 652 (1980).
See also Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A
Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675, 682-85 (1975)(discussing
problems with the Advisory Committee's draft which led to Congress' interven-
tion in the rulemaking process).
7. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 509-3
(1993).
8. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 47 (3d ed. 1991).
9. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, at 509-1.
10. Id. T 509[01], at 509-10.
11. Id. at 509-3.
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negative' 2 reaction to Rule 509 was "violent."13 Given the Watergate
confrontation between Congress and the President over claims of exec-
utive privilege,14 Congress decided to delay the effective date of the
proposed rules, including Rule 509, for two years.' 5 The opposition to
Rule 509 was so substantial and vehement that "in itself" it was prob-
ably "sufficient" to prompt Congress' decision.' 6 Both the House and
Senate then held hearings on the rules.
In the hearings, the privilege provisions in Article V of the pro-
posed rules became the primary target for criticism.17 There was a
furor over Article V;18 the privilege provisions generated an enor-
mous19 outcry.20 Even before the congressional hearings, the provi-
sions had been an object of intense criticism. The Advisory Committee
had released a preliminary March 1969 draft and a revised March
1971 draft of the rules.21 Many bar organizations submitted com-
ments on the drafts to the committee. In both rounds of comments,
the bar organizations expressed more disagreement with the privilege
rules than with any other provisions. 2 2 When Representative Podell
introduced the legislation delaying the effective date of the proposed
rules, he explained his reasons for doing so. 23 The first consideration
he mentioned was his objection to the privilege provisions.24 Even for-
mer Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg appeared to testify
against Article V.25 According to Judge (then Representative) Hun-
gate, who chaired the House hearings, "50% of the complaints in our
committee related to the [article] on privileges." 26 The official Senate
Judiciary Committee staff memorandum on the proposed rules labeled
that article "extremely controversial."27 The Senate Judiciary Com-
12. Id.
13. Id. 509[.02], at 509-14.
14. Id. T 509[.01], at 501-18. See also id. at 509-3 (observing that it was "a most
inopportune time to require congressional acquiescence for a rule such as Rule
509").
15. Id. at 509-3.
16. Id. 1 501101], at 501-18.
17. Id. 9 501101], at 501-15.
18. Id. 91 501[01], at 501-14.
19. 2 DAVID W. LoUmELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 200, at
635 (1985).
20. WENSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, 91 501[06J, at 501-83.
21. Id. 9 502101] at 502-3.
22. Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Com. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
555, 557 (1973)[hereinafter House Hearing .Z(reply statement of Edward W.
Cleary).
23. Id. at 5-6.
24. Id. at 6-7.
25. Id. at 142-53.
26. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 6.
27. Id. at 356.
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mittee used exactly the same language in its final report.28 In the
form eventually approved by Congress, the privilege article was radi-
cally revised;2 9 it was amended more extensively than any other pro-
vision of the proposed rules.30
Article V dealing with privileges was not only the most controver-
sial part of the proposed rules; in the minds of many, that article was
the most important part of the rules. Most evidentiary rules affect
only behavior in the courtroom. 3 1 The rules determine whether a liti-
gant may introduce certain evidence at trial, but they have little im-
pact on conduct outside the courtroom. Privilege rules are different.32
They affect prelitigation behavior33 such as the freedom with which
patients divulge information to their physicians; they influence every-
day activity34 such as the interaction between husband and wife.
Privilege doctrines thus impact the conduct of citizens outside the
courtroom to a greater extent than other evidentiary rules.3 5 While
other evidentiary rules focus on the institutional legal objective of ac-
curate factfinding,36 privilege doctrines promote extrinsic social val-
ues.3 7 In former Justice Goldberg's words, privilege doctrine is "not
only the concern of the bar. It is the concern of the public at large."38
The rub is that as important as privilege doctrine is, it is extraordi-
narily difficult for the courts to determine the content of privilege doc-
trine under the Federal Rules. As proposed by the Supreme Court,
Article V consisted of thirteen rules,39 including detailed rules giving
the courts affirmative guidance as to the application of such privileges
as spousal, attorney-client, and psychotherapist-patient. However,
Congress enacted only one provision, Rule 501 which now reads:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
28. FEDERAL RuLEs Or EVIDENCE, S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974) re-
printed in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 7051, 7053 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
29. WEiNsTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, at 501-2.
30. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.
31. LouisLL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 204, at 700.
32. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 88-89, 92 (testimony of Prof. J. Francis Paschal,
School of Law, Duke University).
33. Id. at 89.
34. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 158, 172 (testimony of Charles R. Halpern and
George T. Frampton, Jr., appearing on behalf of the Washington Council of
Lawyers).
35. LOUIsELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 200, at 641; WIGrr & GRAHAM, supra
note 6, § 5422, at 680.
36. WRIGHT & GRAHM, supra note 6, § 5422, at 668.
37. Id.; WEINSTEiN & BERGER, supra note 7, T 501101], at 501-16.
38. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 143 (testimony of Arthur J. Goldberg).
39. WEINSTEiN & BERGER, supra note 7, 501[01], at 501-14.
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the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State
law. 40
The text of Rule 501 grants the courts a power to determine federal
privilege law but is devoid of even a suggestion as to how the courts
are to exercise that power.4 1 The one indisputable item of legislative
history is Congress' negative refusal to enact the provisions proposed
by the Court. However, the courts have traditionally been leery of re-
lying on legislative inaction as evidence of congressional intent.42 As
one state supreme court recently remarked, "Legislative inaction is a
weak reed upon which to lean ... ."43 The Supreme Court itself has
cautioned that it is "slow to attribute significance" to Congress' failure
to enact a piece of proposed legislation.44 There are so many possible
explanations for Congress' inaction45 that the failure may be "an unre-
liable indicator of legislative intent."46
In light of the difficulty of this task of statutory construction, it
should come as no surprise that the courts are currently badly divided
over the proper interpretation of Rule 501. On the one hand, some
lower federal courts have recognized privileges which were not codi-
fied in the Supreme Court's proposal; these courts have gone "well be-
yond" the list of privileges established at common law before the
adoption of the Federal Rules.47 On the other hand, as one of the lead-
ing commentators on federal privilege law, Professor Daniel Capra,
has pointed out, several federal courts have embraced the polar ex-
treme position.48 Some have erected "a strong presumption" against
the recognition of new privileges,49 and one has gone to the length of
ruling that Rule 501 precludes the courts from recognizing any privi-
40. FED. R. Evm. 501.
41. WIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5422, at 691.
42. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGIS-
LATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC PoLIcY 766, 772 (1988).
43. People v. King, 851 P.2d 27, 38 (Cal. 1993). See also Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 869 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1994)(UUnpassed bills have
little value as evidence of legislative intent."),
44. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983). See also Zuber
v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969) ("Legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow"
in statutory interpretation.); Bellsouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335,
1344 n. 13 (N.D. Ala. 1994) ("[F]ailed legislative proposals are 'a particularly dan-
gerous ground on which to rest an interpretation .... ' ").
45. Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REv. 247, 266.
46. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299, 1318 (Cal. 1987).
47. LoUtSELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 201, at 647.
48. Daniel Capra, The Federal Law of Privileges, 16 LrrIG. 32 (Fall 1989).




lege which did not exist at common law prior to the enactment of the
Federal Rules.50 The upshot is that privilege doctrine continues to be
"the most controversial area of federal evidence law."51 Although the
Supreme Court has handed down more decisions construing Article V
than any other part of the Federal Rules,52 this sharp split of author-
ity persists.53
The purpose of this Article is to explore that split of authority.
Part I of the Article is descriptive. It reviews the history of the privi-
lege provisions of the Federal Rules and traces the evolution of those
provisions from their initial proposal by the Advisory Committee to
their final enactment by Congress.
Part II of the Article is evaluative. This Part analyzes the merits
of the question of the interpretation of Rule.501. The analysis pro-
ceeds in the fashion of an Hegelian dialectic.54 It was the eighteenth
and nineteenth century German philosopher Hegel55 who argued that
truth can emerge from the clash of a thesis and its antithesis by yield-
ing a synthesis incorporating the elements of truth in the thesis and
antithesis.56 The question of the interpretation of Rule 501 lends it-
self to an Hegelian mode of analysis. Section H.A of this Article criti-
ques the thesis that Rule 501 should be construed as foreclosing57 or
discouraging58 the recognition of new privileges. Section II.B consid-
ers the competing antithesis that the rule permits59 or even encour-
ages 60 the courts to formulate new privileges. Finally, section ll.C
develops the synthesis that the context of Rule 501-the bias implicit
in the other articles of the Federal Rules strongly favoring the admis-
sion of relevant evidence-compels the conclusion that the federal
courts should exercise great caution in announcing new privileges.
The Article concludes that the courts which champion a restrictive ap-
proach to the interpretation of Rule 501 are right but for the wrong
reason.
50. Capra, supra note 48, at 35 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 906 (1989)).
51. Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural (Il)logic of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1339 (1992).
52. Id.
53. Capra, supra note 48, at 32.
54. WILL DuRANT, TnE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 295 (1961).
55. ALBuREY CASTELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILosoPmY 452 (2d ed. 1963).
Hegel was born in 1770 and died in 1831. 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
435 (Paul Edwards, ed. 1967).
56. 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 55, at 443-46; DuRAir, supra
note 54, at 295-96 ("thesis, antithesis, and synthesis").
57. Capra, supra note 48, at 35.
58. Id. at 35-36.
59. In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426,429-30 (5th Cir. 1981); 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 6, § 5425, at 225 (1993 Supp.).
60. WaxGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5425, at 710-11.
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I. THE PAST HISTORY OF THE ENACTMENT OF ARTICLE V
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. The Drafting of the Proposed Rules by the Judicial
Branch
In early 1961, the standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States recom-
mended the establishment of an Advisory Committee to consider the
feasibility and advisability of promulgating uniform evidentiary rules
for federal courts.6 ' The Judicial Conference approved the proposal,62
and the Chief Justice then appointed the committee.63 In late 1961,64
the committee filed its report, advocating that the Supreme Court ex-
ercise its rulemaking authority, conferred by Congress, to formulate
uniform federal evidentiary rules.
In 1965, the Chief Justice appointed an Advisory Committee to
draft such rules.65 In March 1969,66 the committee submitted its pre-
liminary draft.67 The draft included Article V devoted to privileges.
Article V was comprised of thirteen rules.68 Nine of the rules con-
cerned specific privileges: 5-02 required reports, 5-03 lawyer-client,
5-04 psychotherapist-patient, 5-05 spousal, 5-06 communication to
clergypersons, 5-07 political vote, 5-08 trade secrets, 5-09 state
secrets, and 5-10 identity of informer. Three other rules related to
such general issues as waiver (5-11 and 5-12) and adverse comment
upon a privilege (5-13).
Although the above rules attracted some attention, the most re-
vealing rule was 5-01. Rule 5-01 read:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress, and except as provided in these rules and in the
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, no person has a privilege to:
(a) Refuse to be a witness; or
(b) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(c) Refuse to produce any object or writing;, or
(d) Prevent another from being a witness or diclosing any matter or produc-
ing any object or writing. 69
61. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., RULES OF EVIDENCE: A PRELIINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND
FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFoRM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR TM UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS v-vi (1962).
62. Id. The conference approved the proposal at its March 13-14, 1961 session.
63. Id. at vi.
64. Id. at x. The report was ified in December 1961.
65. CODM . ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCED. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., PRE.mINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 6 (1969).
66. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, 502[01], at 502-3.
67. WRIGHT & GRAHAm, supra note 6, § 5421, at 647.
68. Id. § 5421, at 647-48.
69. Id. § 5421, at 648 n.2.
1994]
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Even standing alone, Rule 5-01 would have had several dramatic ef-
fects. To begin with, it would have required federal courts to apply
federal privilege law-even in cases in which state substantive law
supplied the rule of decision. Moreover, the exceptive language in the
introductory phrase of the statute would have frozen federal privilege
law;7O the federal courts would have been denied the power to create
new privileges.71 Since the rules nowhere codified a general medical
privilege or a privilege for confidential interspousal communications,
those privileges would have been abolished.72 Even though Rules 5-
02 through 5-10 recognized some privileges, many of the statutory
versions of those privileges were rather narrow;73 and Rule 5-01
would have curtailed the federal courts' power to expand the privi-
leges to their pre-Federal Rules scope.74
In March 1971, the Advisory Committee released a revised draft of
the rules. 7 5 The 1971 draft retained all thirteen rules in Article V.
The draft made one change in what was newly designated Rule 501.76
The draft substituted "other rules adopted by the Supreme Court" for
"the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure" in the exceptive phrase at
the beginning of the statute.77
Both drafts of Article V touched off a flurry of criticism.78 One
thrust of the criticism was that it was at the very least unwise to de-
preciate state interests by thoroughly federalizing privilege law.79
Critics argued that if state interests were weighty enough to require
the application of state substantive law, the interests also warranted
the recognition of state evidentiary privileges. Another line of criti-
cism attacked the elimination of such traditional privileges as those
shielding the spousal and physician-patient relationships.80
Despite these criticisms, the Advisory Committee remained intran-
sigent.81 The criticism did not deter the committee from forwarding
the proposed rules, including the committee's version of Article V on
privileges, to the Judicial Conference.82 The committee succeeded in
"push[ing] Rule 501 through the Judicial Conference and the Supreme
70. Id. § 5422, at 686.
71. Id. § 5422, at 678.
72. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 200, at 637; WRaIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 6, § 5422, at 686.
73. WEINSTEiN & BERGER, supra note 7, T 5011011, at 501-15.
74. LouisELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 200, at 637.
75. W INsTqiN & BERGER, supra note 7, $ 502101], at 502-3.
76. WRaIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5421, at 651.
77. Id.
78. Id. § 5421, at 648, 651.
79. Id. § 5421, at 648-50. The related questions were whether it was constitutional
to do so and whether the Rules Enabling Act authorized the courts to do so.
80. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 200, at 639.
81. WiuGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5421, at 652.
82. Id. § 5421, at 651.
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Court without further change."SS The draft rules were sent to the
Supreme Court in November 1971.84 A year later in November 1972,
the Court approved the proposed rules by an 8-1 vote and transmitted
them to Congress.85 The lone dissenter was Justice Douglas.8 6 He
questioned whether the Court's statutory rulemaking power author-
ized the promulgation of evidentiary rules. Justice Douglas asserted:
There are those who think that fashioning of rules of evidence is a task for the
legislature, not for the judiciary. Wigmore thought the task was essentially a
judicial one ... and I share that view, leaving the problem for case-to-case
development by the courts or by Congress. 8 7
B. The Revision of the Proposed Rules by Congress
The complaints lodged during the rulemaking phase against Arti-
cle V obviously did not persuade the Advisory Committee or the Court
to revise the privilege provisions.88 However, the complaints resur-
faced when the draft of the proposed rules reached Congress.8 9
As previously stated, the draft rules had the misfortune of reach-
ing Congress when the Watergate confrontation between Congress
and the President was developing. The inclusion of a broad govern-
ment privilege provision, Rule 509, in Article V virtually ensured the
draft a cool reception on the Hill. Legislation was quickly introduced
to extend the time for congressional consideration of the proposed
rules. Representative Bertram Podell of New York was one of the
sponsors of the legislation.90 In his remarks, he cited six evidentiary
issues which, in his judgment, required special congressional atten-
tion.9 1 Four of those issues related to privileges. 92 With Watergate
lurking in the background, the legislation passed easily.
After Congress acted to delay the implementation of the rules, the
House and Senate held hearings on the rules.
1. House Action on the Proposed Rules
In February and March 1973, the Special Committee on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Judiciary Committee, chaired by
83. Id. § 5421, at 652.
84. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 311 (testimony of Herbert Semmel, Washington
Council of Lawyers).
85. COMMUNICATION, supra note 5, at v.
86. Id. atvi.
87. Id.
88. LOUISEMLL & MuEiLER, supra note 19, § 200, at 639.
89. Id.
90. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 9 (testimony of Bertram L. Podell, Representa-
tive in Congress from the State of New York).
91. Id. at 6-7.
92. Id. at 6-7.
1994]
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Representative Hungate, held hearings on the rules.93 That commit-
tee was later renamed the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice and held
further hearings.94 Several themes emerged from the hearings.
One theme was sharp disagreement with the Advisory Commit-
tee's attempt to federalize privilege law. One of the most outspoken
critics of the committee's draft of Rule 501 was Chief Judge Friendly
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He testi-
fied in the first set of House hearings.95 To be sure, he attacked sev-
eral specific privilege provisions. For example, he faulted Rule 504 for
omitting a general medical privilege,96 while contending that Rule 509
on government privilege and Rule 510 on informers were excessively
broad.97 However, he made it abundantly clear that his "most serious
objection" was to Rule 501's purported ouster of state privilege law
from federal court.98 He declared that when a federal court sits "to
enforce a state-created right," it would be "offensive" to disregard state
evidentiary privileges.99
The other theme-which Judge Friendly had touched upon-was
the unsoundness of many of other rules in Article V dealing with par-
ticular privileges.' 00 As shall be seen in greater detail in section H.B,
the testimony related to specific privileges was conflicting. However,
as a generalization, there were several principal variations on this
theme during the testimony. In some cases, witnesses argued that the
Advisory Committee erred in failing to codify particular privileges,
such as those for the accountant-client,1o physician-patient,1o 2 and
spousal'0 3 relationships, and a shield law for newspersons.104 In
other cases, witnesses urged that the Advisory Committee had codi-
fied an unduly narrow version of a privilege. Witnesses cited the at-
torney-client,10 5 psychotherapist-patient,o clergyperson-penitent,i0 7
and trade secret'Os privileges as illustrative. In still other cases, wit-
93. Id.
94. Proposed Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973)[hereinafter House Hearing I1].
95. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 246-65.
96. Id. at 263-64.
97. Id. at 264.
98. Id. at 263.
99. Id.
100. WEINsTEiN & BERGaR, supra note 7, 501101], at 501-17.
101. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 583.
102. Id. at 7, 192, 204, 242, 342, 449, 468; House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 45, 66.
103. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 7, 204, 241.
104. Id. at 7, 240, 367-68, 544-45, 584; House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 23.
105. House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 76, 79, 89-90, 277.
106. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 236, 449-73, 475, 499, 513.
107. House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 118.
108. Id. at 75, 79.
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nesses took the position that the scope of the privilege was too broad.
Rules 509109 on government privilege and 510110 on informers were
subjected to that criticism.
When the dust settled at the end of the House hearings, it was
apparent that the committee, and Chairperson Hungate in particular,
agreed with Judge Friendly that the Federal Rules should not sup-
plant state privilege law in diversity cases.' 1 ' In addition, the com-
mittee discovered that it was much easier to attack the specific
privilege rules than to devise acceptable substitutes."12 The commit-
tee voted to approve a June 28, 1973 print deleting all the specific
provisions rules, namely, Rules 502-13."13 Only Rule 501 remained,
and the new print of Rule 501 read:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience: Provided, That in civil actions, with re-
spect to a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.1 14
This language is substantially similar to the wording finally approved
by Congress."15
The committee sent its draft, including the newly worded Rule 501,
to the floor of the House."16 The House amended the bill to specifically
provide that the Supreme Court could not adopt privilege rules with-
out affirmative approval by Congress."37 That provision now appears
in Federal Evidence Rule 1102118 and 28 U.S.C. § 2074."19 The
amended bill won House approval.120
2. Senate Action on the Proposed Rules
The scene then shifted to the Senate. The Senate Committee on
the Judiciary held hearings in early June 1974.121 Even before the
hearings, there were strong inklings of Senate dissatisfaction with the
109. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 6-7, 106-07, 125, 132-41, 160, 191, 264, 446;
House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 122-25, 192.
110. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 125-27, 228, 236, 253, 264.
111. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5421, at 654.
112. Id. § 5421, at 653.
113. House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 145-47.
114. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5421, at 654 n.39.
115. Id. § 5421, at 654.
116. Id. § 5421, at 657.
117. Id. § 5421, at 658.
118. FED. R. Evm. 1102.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (1988).
120. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5421, at 658.
121. Senate Hearing, supra note 1.
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proposed rules. Several senators either testified or submitted com-
ments during the House hearings. Judge (then Senator) Ervin noted
the controversies swirling around the rules.122 Senators Abourezk123
and McClellan124 singled out the proposed government privilege rules
for criticism.
The same themes that had surfaced in the House hearings re-
curred in the Senate hearings. Some witnesses complained that the
Advisory Committee's draft of Article V slighted state interests.125
Other witnesses attacked the scope of particular privilege rules
drafted by the Advisory Committee.126 Various interest groups ap-
peared to demand privileges. 127
When all was said and done in the Senate hearings, though, the
Senate committee found itself in general agreement with the House.
Its report stated that with two notable exceptions, it "agree[d] with
the main thrust of the House amendment" of the Advisory Commit-
tee's draft.2s One exception was the House provision requiring con-
gressional approval of any rule changes related to privileges.12 9 The
Senate substitute authorized either house to defer a Court-proposed
change, but it would not have required affirmative congressional ap-
proval.130 The second, more important exception was the final proviso
in the House version, discussing the recognition of state evidentiary
privileges in federal court.131 The Senate committee was "concerned
that the language used in the House amendment" was vague and
therefore "could be difficult to apply."132 The committee report stated:
The question of what is an element of a claim or defense is likely to engender
considerable litigation. If the matter in question constitutes an element of a
claim, State law supplies the privilege rule; whereas if it is a mere item of
proof with respect to a claim, then, even though State law might supply the
rule of decision, Federal law on the privilege would apply. Further, disputes
will arise as to how the rule should be applied in an antitrust action or in a tax
case where the Federal statute is silent as to a particular aspect of the sub-
stantive law in question, but Federal cases had incorporated State law by ref-
erence to State law.133
In the committee's opinion, the phrasing of the House bill was "preg-
nant with litigious mischief."134
122. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 2-3.
123. Id. at 388.
124. Id. at 317-23.
125. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 91.
126. Id. at 280-81, 356.
127. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5421, at 658-59.
128. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 11.
129. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 200, at 642-43.
130. Id. at 642 n.21.
131. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 28, at 11-12.
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To remedy that problem, the Senate committee drafted its own ver-
sion of Rule 501. Its draft reworded the concluding proviso to read:
mlla civil actions and proceedings arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1335 or between citizens of different States and removed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b) the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political sub-
division thereof is determined in accordance with State law, unless with re-
spect to the particular claim or defense, Federal law supplies the rule of
decision.1 3 5
The Senate approved that version of Rule 501 without debate.136
3. Conference Committee Action on the Proposed Rules
The Conference Committee convened to work out the differences
between the House and Senate versions of the proposed rules. The
committee filed its report in late 1974.137 The Conference Committee
opted for the House version of Rule 501.138 The committee believed
that the wording of the House version was sufficiently clear. The com-
mittee added that in cases "where a federal court adopts or incorpo-
rates state law to fill interstices or gaps in federal statutory phrases,
the court generally will apply federal privilege law."13 9 It is true that
in such cases, the federal court may be applying a rule originating in
state law; "but in the final analysis [in such cases] its decision turns
upon the law of the United States, not that of any state."140 Rule 501
then took its present form, set out in the introduction to this Article.
Both legislative chambers agreed to the conference report before
the close of 1974;14- and they approved Public Law 93-595, including
the present form of Rule 501, on January 2, 1975.142 On January 3,
1975, President Ford signed the legislation promulgating the Federal
Rules of Evidence.143 The rules became effective July 1, 1975.144
135. Id. at 16 (amended at 2).
136. Id.
137. CONFERENCE COMmITTEE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVmENCE, H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974) reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 7098 [hereinaf-
ter CONFERENCE Comm. REPORT].
138. WEiNsTEiN & BERGER, supra note 7, at 501-4.
139. CONFERENCE Cosmi. REPORT, supra note 137, at 7.
140. Id. (quoting D'Oench, Duhne & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,
471 (1942)(Jackson, J., concurring)).
141. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES iii (1975).
142. Id. at 1.
143. Bill Establishing Rules of Evidence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates, 11 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs. DOc., 12 (Jan. 6, 1975).
144. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1974)(establishing effective
date at 180 days after date of enactment).
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II. AN HEGELIAN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATION OF PAST
HISTORY FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTICLE V OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
As Professor Capra has noted,145 many lower federal courts are
now advancing the thesis that Rule 501 should be construed restric-
tively, either precluding or at least discouraging the recognition of
new privileges. Following Hegel's example, the initial section of this
Part of the Article critiques that thesis. The next section analyzes the
antithetical, expansive view; under that view, Rule 501 encourages
the formulation of new privileges or at least grants the courts full com-
mon-law power to do so. The third and final section arrives at the
correct interpretation of Rule 501 by synthesizing the elements of
truth in the thesis and antithesis.
A. The Restrictive Thesis
1. The View that Rule 501 Precludes the Courts from
Recognizing New Privileges
At least one federal court has adopted the strict view that Rule 501
forecloses the possibility of recognizing any privilege which did not ex-
ist at common law before the adoption of the Federal Rules.146 As
Professor Capra concedes, that view is a plausible reading of the lan-
guage of Rule 501.147 According to the text of Rule 501, "the princi-
ples of the common law" govern federal privilege doctrine.148 If
"principles" means "rules," Rule 501 arguably requires the federal
courts to follow the earlier, common-law privilege rules. Indeed, in
the House hearings, one witness criticized the proposed wording of
Rule 501 precisely because it was susceptible to this interpretation.
There is a real danger... that the reference to "common law principles" will
be construed to deny automatically recognition of any claim of privilege not
grounded in 19th Century common-law decisions.14 9
Passages in several Supreme Court privilege decisions lend support to
this interpretation. In two opinions applying the attorney-client privi-
lege, the Court emphasized that it is "the oldest" common-law privi-
145. Capra, supra note 48, at 35-36.
146. Id. at 35 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 906 (1989)). Professor Capra observes that this view is consistent
with the holdings in the cases refusing to recognize claims for novel privileges
such as one for academic scholars and self-critical assessment by corporations.
Id. at 36.
147. Id. at 35. See also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5425, at 708 (noting that
Rule 501 may be interpreted to mean only the American common law).
148. FED. R. EVID. 501.
149. House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 208.
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lege.150 Similarly, in its decision refusing to recognize a federal
privilege for official acts of state legislators,151 the Court noted that
the privilege lacked "historical antecedents" at common law;15 2 the
doctrine was not an "established"'53 one, "indelibly ensconced in our
common law." 5 4
On balance, however, this restrictive interpretation is flawed. The
text and context of Rule 501 as well as the relevant extrinsic legisla-
tive history dictate the conclusion that this interpretation is unsound.
The text of Rule 501 employs the word, "principles," not "rules" or
"privileges." Admittedly, "principles" is ambiguous. However, the
word normally denotes a proposition at a higher level of generality
than a mere rule.' 55 A narrow proposition such as the statement that
the attorney-client privilege extends to a client's conversations with
her attorney's aides would constitute a "rule." However, we would
classify as a "principle" the more generalized proposition that a court
should adjudicate privilege claims by balancing the loss of relevant
evidence against the extrinsic social values promoted by the privi-
lege.156 The text of many other Federal Rules uses the expression,
"rules."'5 7 In fact, in its final proviso, Rule 501 includes the term,
"rnle."158 When a legislature uses different terms, it is normally as-
sumed that the legislature meant different things.'59 Congress' selec-
tion of the term "principles" presumably indicates that it meant
something other than the common-law privilege rules in effect at the
time of the adoption of the Federal Rules.
The context of the term "privileges'-that is, the rest of Rule 501-
is consistent with that presumption.
A useful technique in analyzing... language ... is to redraft it twice, staying
as faithful to the original as possible, so that it would clearly require a deci-
sion, first for one [legal outcome], then for the other. Which comes closer to...
the language [actually] used?1 6 0
It would have been a simple matter for the drafters to word Rule 501
to state that federal privilege questions would be governed by "com-
150. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
151. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
152. Id. at 368.
153. Id. at 366.
154. Id. at 368.
155. See RONALD DwoiUaN, TAauNG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977).
156. CAmsoN, supra note 8, at 732-34.
157. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 402.
158. FED. R. Evm. 501.
159. See, e.g., Crespin v. Kizer, 276 Cal. Rptr. 571, 579 (Ct. App. 1990); Interinsurance
Exchange v. Spectrum Inv., 258 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Ct. App. 1989); Kuhs v. Superior
Court, 247 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Ct. App. 1988).
160. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
TRAcTs 139-40 (4th ed. 1988).
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mon-law rules" or "privileges recognized at common law." Congress
chose different, lengthier language ("the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted... in the light of reason and experience").
That choice is at odds with the assumption that Congress wanted to
confine the courts to privileges which were settled fixtures at common
law.
Like the text and context, the legislative history material under-
cuts the restrictive view. Negatively, that material demonstrates that
Congress repudiated the Advisory Committee's view that federal priv-
ilege law should be frozen.161 The Advisory Committee's draft of Rule
501 would have expressly mandated that the courts recognize only the
privileges codified in proposed Rules 502-10 and in other statutes.
Whatever else Congress did, it rebuffed that version of Rule 501.162
As the Supreme Court observed in its 1980 decision in Trammel v.
United States,163
[i]n rejecting the proposed Rules and enacting Rule 501, Congress manifested
an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege. Its purpose rather
was to "provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a
case-by-case basis," and to leave the door open to change. 1 6 4
Affirmatively, the legislative history strongly suggests that Con-
gress used the term "principles" in a methodological sense; rather
than referring to a static165 set of common-law privilege rules, Con-
gress meant a dynamic methodology that the courts could use to
evolve privilege doctrine.166 Many witnesses expressed opposition to
any attempt to freeze privilege doctrine.167 One of the leading Ameri-
can authorities on privilege law, the late Professor David Louisell,
urged Congress to authorize the courts to use "the common law evolu-
tionary method" to develop privilege doctrine. 1 68 Other witnesses con-
curred, adding that that method would empower the courts to "expand
on" existing privilege doctrine.169 Representative Holtzman, one of
the most vociferous critics of the Advisory Committee's draft, voiced
her hope that the House version of Rule 501 would reinstate the com-
mon-law "tradition."170 The essence of that tradition is a methodology
161. WmGHr & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5422, at 686-88.
162. Id. at 688.
163. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
164. Id. at 47 (citing 120 CONG. REc. 40891 (1974)(statement of Rep. Hungate); S. REp.
No. 93-1277, p. 11 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-650, p. 8 (1973)).
165. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5422, at 667.
166. LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 201, at 655; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 6, § 5422, at 709-10.
167. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, 1 501[01], at 501-17.
168. House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 242.
169. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 305.
170. WRmGr & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5422, at 689. See also LoUISELL & MUELLER,
supra note 19, § 201, at 655 (referring to the endorsement of the common law
tradition).
[Vol. 73:511
HEGELIAN APPROACH TO PRIVILEGES
of legal reasoning.171 The Senate committee report endorsed "evolved"
privilege rules. 172 Citing the Senate and House reports, the Court in
Trammel v. United States' 73 declared that "[tlhe Federal Rules of Evi-
dence acknowledge the authority of the federal courts to continue the
evolutionary development of testimonial privileges .... "1 7 4
The very genesis of the language of Rule 501 shows that Rule 501
was intended to enable the federal courts to employ a dynamic com-
mon-law methodology. The language, "principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the federal courts in the light of reason
and experience," derived immediately from Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26.175 In the note accompanying its version of Rule 501,
the Advisory Committee specifically cited that language and explained
why it had refused to include that language in its version. 176 In turn,
the wording of Criminal Rule 26 is traceable'77 to the Supreme
Court's 1934 decision in Wolfle v. United States.178 Citing a still ear-
lier opinion, Funk v. United States,17 9 the Court in Wolfle referred to
"common law principles as interpreted and applied by the federal
courts in the light of reason and experience."so The reference in Wol-
fie was incorporated almost verbatim into the wording of Rule 501 fi-
nally approved by Congress.'18 In Trammel, the Supreme Court
identified Wolfie as the immediate source of the key language in Rule
501.182 In the Funk opinion itself, 83 the ultimate source of the lan-
guage, the Court made it clear that the "principle[s]"' 8 4 of common
law notably include a methodology. Those "principle[s]" give the com-
mon law its "characteristic"'8 5 "flexibility and capacity for growth and
adaptation."' 8 6 In the Court's words, that methodology facilitates
"progressive growth and wise adaptation."18 7
171. PAUL J. MIsmm & CLARENCE MORRIS, ON LAW IN CouRTs: AN INTRODUCTION TO
JuDicuL DEvELOPMET oF CASE AND STATUTE LAw 88-89 (1965)(the Grand Tradi-
tion of the Common Law).
172. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 12.
173. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
174. Id. at 47.
175. WEn STENw & BERGER, supra note 7, 501[01], at 501-21.
176. Id. at 501-7 to 501-8.
177. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 201, at 646.
178. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
179. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
180. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934).
181. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 201, at 646.
182. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,47 (1980).
183. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
184. Id. at 383.
185. Id.




In conclusion, the restrictive view, precluding the recognition of
new privileges, cannot be reconciled with the text, context, or legisla-
tive history of Rule 501.
2. The View that Rule 501 at Least Discourages the Courts from
Recognizing New Privileges.
As Professor Capra has pointed out, some courts embracing the re-
strictive thesis have stopped short of holding that Rule 501 absolutely
forecloses the recognition of new privileges. These courts take the po-
sition that Rule 501 erects "a strong presumption" against the crea-
tion of novel privileges.188 The lower federal courts have frequently
blocked attempts to fashion new privileges.l8 9 In 1990, in University
of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,19o
the Supreme Court avowed that it was "disinclined" to exercise its
power under Rule 501 "expansively."19 1 The proponents of the restric-
tive thesis argue that Rule 501 mandates that the federal courts exer-
cise such caution in evaluating claims of novel privileges.
However, like the view that Rule 501 altogether precludes the rec-
ognition of new privileges, this view is spurious. The view runs afoul
of both the text and the legislative history of Rule 501.
To begin with, the text of the rule does not state or imply that in
exercising the power conferred by Rule 501, the courts are to entertain
a bias against novel privilege claims. Other Federal Rule provisions
state explicit biases. For example, when the judge is balancing the
probative value of relevant evidence against any attendant probative
dangers under Rule 403, the statute generally provides that the judge
may exclude the evidence only if the probative value "is substantially
outweighed by the" probative risks.192 When the question is balanc-
ing the probative value of an old193 conviction proffered for impeach-
ment purposes, Rule 609(b) directs the judge to bar the evidence
188. Capra, supra note 48, at 35-36.
189. United States v. Snelenberger, 24 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1994) (involving psychother-
apist privilege); United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1994)(refusing
to recognize psychotherapist privilege in criminal cases); Mason v. Stock, 869 F.
Supp. 828 (D. Kan. 1994)(refusing to recognize self-critical analysis privilege); In
re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury, 787 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mich. 1992)(re-
fusing to recognize accountant-client privilege); LouisELL & MUELLER, supra note
19, § 201, at 650 (collecting cases); Capra, supra note 48, at 61 (collecting cases
rejecting the claimed privileges for academic research and corporate self-
criticism).
190. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
191. Id. at 189.
192. FED. R. Evm. 403.
193. FED. R. Evm. 609(b). A conviction is old or remote in time under the statute if"a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, which-
ever is the later date." Id.
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unless "the probative value of the conviction ... substantially out-
weighs its prejudicial effect."' 94 Thus, when Congress wanted to bias
the courts' exercise of discretionary powers under the Federal Rules in
a particular direction, Congress often did so explicitly. Congress did
not do so in the text of Rule 501.
Furthermore, this restrictive view runs afoul of the legislative his-
tory of the rule. The tenor of most of the negative comments voiced
during the congressional hearings was that the Advisory Committee
had gone too far in restricting evidentiary privileges.' 9 5 To be sure,
there was some criticism of the breadth of proposed Rules 509196 and
510197 relating to government privilege. However, any fair reading of
the House and Senate hearings demonstrates that the vast majority of
the criticisms levelled against Article V faulted the Advisory Commit-
tee for cutting back on evidentiary privileges. In some cases, the wit-
nesses took the committee to task for abolishing traditional privileges
such as the medical privilege'9S and the privilege for confidential
spousal communications.' 9 9 Other witnesses contended that the rules
embodied undesirably narrow versions of the privileges for the
attorney-client,20 0  psychotherapist-patient,2 0 ' and clergyperson-
penitent2 o 2 relationships. The Senate committee report cited the Ad-
visory Committee's "controversial ... restrictions upon common law
privileges" 20 3 as one of the foremost reasons for the committee's rejec-
tion of the early draft of Article V. In light of this legislative history, it
is untenable to argue that Rule 501 itself decrees that the courts fol-
low a "strong formal presumption against new privileges."204
B. The Expansive Antithesis
The preceding section reviewed the position of the courts favoring a
restrictive interpretation of Rule 501. Other courts prefer an expan-
sive2 0 5 interpretation of the statute. This preference takes two forms.
194. Id.
195. WmGHT & GaMRAm, supra note 6, § 5425, at 710. See also id. § 5422, at 690.
196. E.g., House Hearing I, supra note 94, at 122, 191.
197. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 228, 236-37, 253, 264.
198. Id. at 7, 192-94, 242-43, 342, 449, 468-69; House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 45,
66.
199. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 7, 240.
200. WEmNSrEIn & BERGER, supra note 7, S 503101], at 503-14 n.5.
201. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 449-70, 475, 499, 513.
202. House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 116, 118.
203. SENATE REPoRT, supra note 28, at 11.
204. Capra, supra note 48, at 36.
205. Note, supra note 51, at 1351.
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1. The View that Under Rule 501, the Courts Should Be More
Receptive to Privilege Claims Than They Were at
Common Law Before the Enactment of the
Federal Rules.
One form of the expansive view is that the federal courts should be
more open to novel privilege claims than they were before the passage
of the Federal Rules. During the House and Senate hearings, the bulk
of the criticism2O6 of the Advisory Committee draft was that the draft
did not go far enough in extending the protection of privileges; critics
complained that the draft of Article V abolished a number of tradi-
tional privileges,207 drastically pruned others,2 O8 and failed to incor-
porate some more contemporary privileges such as a shield law for
journalists.2 O9 Congress seemingly agreed with this criticism; and, in
the minds of some commentators, that apparent agreement "suggests
that Congress intended that courts should be more receptive to novel
claims of privilege than they have been in the past."21 Again, the
Senate committee report stated that in part, the Advisory Committee
draft was unacceptable because it contained "controversial... restric-
tions" on privileges.211 On the House floor, one of the conferees ex-
plaining the Conference Committee version of Rule 501 stated: "The
language of Rule 501 permits the courts to develop a privilege for
newspaperpeople on a case-by-case basis. The language cannot be in-
terpreted as a congressional expression in favor of having no such
privilege .... 2 12
Some lower federal court decisions are best explicable under this
expansive view. They recognize privileges which were not accepted
under the common law prevailing at the time of the adoption of the
Federal Rules.213 The advocates of this expansive view can also find
some comfort in two 1980 Supreme Court opinions construing Rule
501. In one, the Court stated that Rule 501 "provide[s] the courts with
greater flexibility in developing rules of privilege."214 In the other de-
206. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5425, at 710.
207. LOUiSELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 200, at 639; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 6, § 5425, at 710.
208. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, 1 501[01], at 501-15.
209. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5425, at 710.
210. Id.
211. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 11.
212. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5421, at 663-64 n.73 (citing 120 CONG. REC.
40891 (1974)).
213. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 201, at 647 (collecting cases). See also In
re John Doe, 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992)(psychotherapist privilege); Covell v.
CNG Transmission Corp., 863 F. Supp. 202 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (psychiatrist-patient
privilege); United States v. D.F., 857 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D. Wis. 1994)(psychothera-
pist-patient privilege); Mann v. University of Cincinnati, 824 F. Supp. 1190,
1197-98 (S.D. Ohio 1993)(general medical privilege).
214. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980).
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cision, the Court not only stated that Rule 501 authorizes "the federal
courts [to] develop[ I testimonial privilege law;"2 1 5 the Court even
averred that "Congress encouraged such development."216
Although these judicial opinions and legislative materials bolster
the expansive view, this view is as fallacious as the restrictive views
discussed earlier. The fallacy is assuming that Congress manifested
any bias on the merits of the question of whether the federal courts
should be receptive or hostile to novel privilege claims. As we shall
see, the most realistic reading of the legislative history is that Con-
gress adopted a neutral stance on that question.
On the one hand, Congress undeniably reached the merits of the
question of whether federal law should displace state evidentiary priv-
ileges in federal court. The Advisory Committee's draft of Rule 501
would have largely supplanted state evidentiary doctrine in federal
trials. However, Congress was obviously in sympathy with the state
interests underlying state evidentiary privileges.217 Congress dis-
played that sympathy in the text of its version of Rule 501. In the
House and Senate reports, the respective committees directly ad-
dressed the merits of that question and indicated their disagreement
with the Advisory Committee. The second sentence of the final ver-
sion of Rule 501 expressly answers the question of when state privi-
lege law controls.
On the other hand, neither the text, context, nor legislative history
of the first sentence of Rule 501 indicates that Congress resolved the
merits of the question of how liberally the federal courts should sus-
tain privilege claims when federal privilege law controls.
The text does not manifest any congressional resolution of the mer-
its of that question. Section H.N pointed out that there is no language
in the statutory text which requires the federal courts to erect a
"strong formal presumption72 1s against new privileges. It is equally
true that there is no wording mandating that the courts adopt an hos-
pitable attitude toward claims of novel privilege. The text is silent on
the question; there is no explicit legislative directive for a bias in favor
of either abolishing or creating privileges.
At least part of the context also supports the conclusion that there
is no statutory bias in either direction. At the Conference Committee's
suggestion, the package of Federal Rules legislation was amended to
reinstate the House provision that any amendment creating, abolish-
ing, or modifying a privilege rule must be affirmatively approved by an
215. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 n.8 (1980).
216. Id.
217. LoTisELL & MuELLER, supra note 19, § 204, at 694; WPRGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 6, § 5421, at 653.
218. Capra, supra note 48, at 36.
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act of Congress. 219 The provision was originally inserted in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2076,220 but in 1988 the provision was shifted to 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b).
The provision reads: "Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying
an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved
by Act of Congress."2 2 1 On its face, the provision makes no distinction
between the creation, abolition, or restriction of a privilege. It is no
easier to create a privilege than it is to abolish or restrict one. Any
change is treated in the same manner procedurally, and the similar
procedural treatment suggests that there is no substantive policy bias
in favor of creation and against abolition or restriction.
Finally, the extrinsic legislative history of the congressional delib-
erations over Article V demonstrates that Rule 501 does not embody
the expansive view. That history includes the witness testimony in
the congressional hearings and the congressional action itself. A close
examination of the testimony and the congressional action undercuts
the expansive view.
The proponents of the expansive view assert that during the testi-
mony in the congressional hearings, most of the dissatisfaction ex-
pressed centered around the Advisory Committee's attempts to
abolish or restrict particular privileges.2 22 As a generalization, that
assertion is correct. However, like many generalizations, it is an over-
simplification and potentially misleading. Although the numerical
majority of critical comments may have had that flavor, "no single rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court provoked as strong a reaction-
almost all of it negative-as did Rule 509."223 The principal indict-
ment of proposed Rule 509 was that it created a government privilege
that was unprecedented224 in its broad scope.22 5
Moreover, the proponents of the expansive view tend to oversim-
plify the tenor of the testimony relating to the other proposed rules.
While the attacks on the Advisory Committee's attempts to abolish
and restrict privileges may have accounted for the majority of the com-
plaints, the testimony was quite conflicting. Many witnesses simulta-
neously called for the expansion of some privileges and the narrowing
of others.226 In addition, with the exception of proposed Rule 507 pro-
219. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, at 501-5.
220. Id.
221. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b)(1988).
222. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5425, at 710.
223. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, at 509-3. See also House Hearing II, supra
note 94, at 118 ("Rule [509] has undergone more discussion... than any other
Rule or Privilege.").
224. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 191.
225. WEiNsTEiN & BERGER, supra note 7, 1 509[01].
226. E.g., House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 106-07, 124-25, 172, 183, 191, 253, 263-
64, 423-24, 446, 483, 497-99, 584-85; House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 23, 51-
52; WmRGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5422, at 687.
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tecting the secrecy of votes, there was some testimony complaining
about the excessive breadth of every proposed privilege. For instance,
witnesses attacked the allegedly broad scope of proposed Rules 502
(required reports),227 503 (attorney-client),228 504 (psychotherapist-
patient),22 9 505 (spousal),23 0 506 (clergyperson),231 and 508 (trade se-
cret).2 32 For that matter, there were some witnesses who argued that
the scope of proposed Rules 509 (government privilege)233 and 510 (in-
formers)234 was too narrow. To further complicate matters, some wit-
nesses complained that at once, a particular privilege was too narrow
in some respects while overly broad in others.235 In short, the tenor of
the testimony was mixed. It is misleading to assert that there was
any consensus among the witnesses on the merits that the scope of
privileges should be expanded; based on the content of the witnesses'
testimony, the only incontrovertible assertion possible is that there
was an impressive amount of controversy among the witnesses.236
As the hearings progressed and it became increasingly clear that
Congress would jettison proposed Rules 502-13, witnesses began com-
menting on Congress' obvious intent to avoid taking a position on the
merits of the question of a policy bias either for or against the creation
of new privileges. Early in the second set of House hearings, one wit-
ness alluded to the widespread impression that Congress was about to
abandon all the specific rules in Article V "in order to avoid conflict
between Congressmen."23 7 Later in the same hearings, a representa-
tive of the Advisory Committee asserted that it appeared that Con-
gress was inclined to adopt a temporary "expedient" approach.238
The witnesses in the subsequent Senate hearings were equally
blunt. One witness asserted that draft Rule 501 was a transparent
attempt by Congress to avoid taking a policy stand on "difficult policy
questions."239 In his words, the draft represented an effort to "side-
227. House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 49-50.
228. House HearingI, supra note 22, at 243,415,420,483,503; Senate Hearing, supra
note 1, at 220, 251-52, 307-08.
229. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 50-51, 276, 282; WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 7, 504[02], at 504-15.
230. House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 277.
231. Id. at 51, 92.
232. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 393, 396-400, 409-15.
233. Id. at 44, 322, 327, 340-41; House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 51-52.
234. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 42-44, 322-23; House Hearing II, supra note
94, at 52-53.
235. E.g., House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 50-51.
236. See WEimHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5421, at 658 ("[Tjhe Senators were un-
doubtedly impressed by the amount of controversy...
237. House Hearing II, supra note 94, at 115.
238. Id. at 293.
239. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 217.
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step" the questions.2 40 Another witness stated that he understood
that Congress had "sound political reasons" for preferring Rule 501.241
He characterized the adoption of Rule 501 as a "politic" course of
action.2 42
More importantly, several aspects of the congressional action indi-
cate that Rule 501 was not intended to address the merits of the ques-
tion of whether the courts should be receptive to novel privilege
claims. When the House committee sent its draft to the floor, it did so
"under an unusual rule that did not permit amendments. 2 43 When
asked to justify the extraordinary procedure, Representative Boling
explained that the procedure was necessary since the draft amounted
to a compromise "that could easily blow up all over the place if
amended."2 44
Representative Hungate appeared as a witness in the Senate hear-
ings. He frankly cautioned the Senate committee that the topic of
privileges was "a very difficult matter."245 The House hearings had
convinced him that "when you open this up, the social workers and the
piano tuners want a privilege."246 Before formal action by the Senate
committee, its staff prepared a memorandum for the committee. 2 47
Echoing Representative Hungate, the memorandum stated that the
entire subject of privileges had proven "extremely controversial."2 48
By way of example, the memorandum asserted that the medical privi-
lege proposal "seemed to satisfy no one."249 The memorandum urged
the adoption of Rule 501, "[s]ince it was clear that no agreement was
likely to be possible as to the content of specific privilege rules, and...
the inability to agree threatened to forestall or prevent passage of an
entire Rules package."2 50 The final Senate report approvingly quoted
these passages from its staff's memorandum.25 1
Perhaps some would say that Congress was guilty of political cow-
ardice.2 52 However, political naivete can get in the way of realistic
240. Id. at 218.
241. Id. at 193.
242. Id.
243. WRiGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5421, at 657.
244. Id. at 657-58 (citing 120 CoNG. REC. 1408 (1974)).
245. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 6.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 355.
248. Id. at 356.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 356-57.
251. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.
252. Such political cowardice may likely explain legislative inaction. Mengler, supra
note 45, at 266. See also LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 204, at 708-09
("Unquestionably there were additional reasons behind the congressional ac-
tion-. . . plain political pressure.").
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interpretation of legislative history material. 253 During the hearings
on the proposed rules, Congress discovered how terribly difficult it
would be to redraft the privilege provisions.2 54 As the Senate staff
memorandum observed, "it was clear that no agreement was likely to
be possible as to the content of specific privilege rules" in the foresee-
able future.25 5 It was not only evident that an attempt to reach agree-
ment might substantially delay the implementation of the other less
controversial articles of the proposed rules, Congress also had other
major challenges to attend to, such as Watergate and the aftermath of
the Vietnam war.25 6 The most sensible conclusion is that Congress
understandably decided to adopt Rule 501 as a rational legislative
choice or a weak political compromise2 57 without resolving the merits
of the substantive policy question.2 58
2. The View that Under Rule 501, the Federal Courts Are as
Free as They Were at Common Law Before the
Adoption of the Federal Rules to Recognize
New Privileges.
The preceding paragraphs establish that Rule 501 does not incor-
porate the extreme expansive view that the federal courts are posi-
tively encouraged to formulate new privileges. However, the
advocates of an expansive interpretation have a fallback position.
They can contend that at the very least, Rule 501 preserves the courts'
pre-Federal Rules, common-law power to create new privileges.
At first blush, that contention squares nicely with both the text of
Rule 501 and its legislative history. The text of the rule refers to "the
principles of the common law."259 The text does not indicate any in-
tent to diminish the courts' pre-Federal Rules power; and absent such
an indication, statutes are ordinarily construed as leaving the com-
mon law intact.2 60 One witness in the Senate hearings opined that
the enactment of Rule 501 would "leave[ ] the law of privilege in the
253. ESKRIDGE & FRIcxEY supra note 42, at 716; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence
Pedagogy in the Age of Statutes, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 227, 231, 234 (1991).
254. WRIGHT & GRAn~am, supra note 6, § 5421, at 653-54.
255. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 356.
256. See WEN5STEn & BERGER, supra note 7, at 509-3.
257. Note, supra note 51, at 1350.
258. See LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 201, at 669 (stating that the congres-
sional reports did not take issue "with the merits of the proposed version in for-
mulating federal law"); WRIGHT & GRAHAm, supra note 6, § 5422, at 691 (stating
that Congress granted the courts powers under Rule 501 "without any attempt to
suggest how those powers should be exercised").
259. FED. R. Evm. 501.
260. Bush v. Oceans Intl, 621 F.2d 207, 211 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980); Welsh v. Century
Products, 745 F. Supp. 313 (D. Md. 1990); Dumas v. Pike County, Miss., 642 F.
Supp. 131 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1990).
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federal courts as it presently exists."2 6 1 There are several passages in
the legislative history indicating that Congress shared that opin-
ion.26 2 The House report stated that Rule 501 "left the law of privi-
leges in its present state."2 63 When Representative Hungate testified
before the Senate committee, he explained that the intent of the
House drafters was that "the law of privilege[ ] is left where we found
it."264 The Senate staff memorandum described Rule 501 as "leaving
the law in its current condition to be developed by the courts,"2 65 and
the final Senate report adopted that precise description of the impact
of Rule 501.266 Hence, it would appear that the plain meaning of Rule
501 is that the courts have the same freedom to frame new privileges
which they enjoyed before the adoption of the Federal Rules.
However, as the Supreme Court has stressed, "the meaning of stat-
utory language, plain or not, depends on context."2 67 It has been
stated that under Rule 501, the federal courts possess "common law-
making powers."268 However, that statement is plainly false. The
courts no longer exercise an inherent common-law power unfettered
by legislative constraints. Rule 501 is a statute. Thus, the courts are
exercising a delegated legislative power.269 The delegation takes the
form of a statute, a legislative act which is part of a larger statutory
scheme. Rule 501 must be interpreted in context.2 70 Under "the
whole act" maxim of statutory construction, 27 1 in interpreting a par-
ticular statutory provision, the court must consider the entire statu-
261. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 305.
262. WmGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5422, at 690-91.
263. HousE Comm. ON THE JUD., FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082.
264. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 6. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, 1
501[01], at 501-20.
265. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 357.
266. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.
267. King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221, (1991). See also Almero v. Im-
migration & Naturalization Service, 18 F.3d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1994) (examining
the structure of the law as a whole including its object and policy); Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Bates, 838 F. Supp. 1216, 1219 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (examining
statutory language in its entirety, not just the disputed provision); People v.
Booker, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715, 718 (Ct. App. 1994) (examining the context of the
entire statutory scheme).
268. Note, supra note 51, at 1340.
269. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, §§ 5422, 5425, at 690, 711.
270. See Harco Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 977 F.2d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir. 1992);
DAE Corp. v. Engeleiter, 958 F.2d 436, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Lambert Steel Co. v.
Heller Fin., Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 457 (Ct. App. 1993); People v. Jimenez, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d 281, 283 (Ct. App. 1992); Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 902 (Ct. App. 1992).
271. ESKRIDGE & FmcsY, supra note 42, at 645-46.
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tory framework.272 Other sections of the same statutory scheme2 73
can shed light on the meaning of the provision to be interpreted.
Like any other statute, Rule 501 must be interpreted contextually.
When Albert Jenner, Jr., the chair of the Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee, appeared in the House hearings, he testified that Article
V had to be viewed in the context of the overall "philosophy" of the
rules. 2 7 4 In 1989, in United States v. Zolin,275 the Supreme Court in
effect applied "the whole act" maxim to the interpretation of Rule 501.
In that case, the question presented was an aspect of the attorney-
client privilege. To resolve the question, the Court read Rule 501 in
light of other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence.276
What insight can the context-the other provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence-give into the correct interpretation of Rule 501? A
review of the context demonstrates that in those other articles, Con-
gress has increased the value attached to the factor the courts must
balance under Rule 501 against the extrinsic values fostered by privi-
leges: the norm that it is undesirable to exclude relevant, reliable evi-
dence. As Mr. Jenner told Congress, the underlying "philosophy" of
the Federal Rules places a premium on that norm.27 7 That philosophy
pervades Articles IV and VI through X, which form the major part of
the context of Rule 501.
The philosophy is evident in Article IV. Article IV begins with a
trilogy of statutes, Rules 401 through 403, reflecting the heightened
emphasis on the norm that the trier.of fact should hear relevant, relia-
ble evidence. Rule 401 incorporates an exceptionally broad definition
of "relevant" evidence. Other evidence statutes such as California Ev-
idence Code section 210278 require that to be relevant, an item of evi-
dence must pertain to a "disputed" issue in the case. The text of Rule
401 omits even that requirement.27 9 Rule 402 reinforces the empha-
272. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192 (3d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 687 (1994); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bates, 838
F. Supp. 1216, 1219 (N.D. Ohio 1993); People v. Booker, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715, 718
(Ct. App. 1994); People v. Wilson, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (Ct. App. 1994); Lambert
Steel Co. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 457 (Ct. App. 1993); Looney v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 187 (Ct. App. 1993); Lilienthal & Fowler v.
Superior Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458, 460 (Ct. App. 1993).
273. People v. Trimble, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495, 497 (Ct. App. 1993); People v. Jimenez,
10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 281, 283 (Ct. App. 1992).
274. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 77, 87-88.
275. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
276. Id. at 565-66, 568 (relying on Rules 104(a) and 1101(c) as well as Rule 501).
277. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 87-88.
278. CAL. Evm. CODE § 210 (West 1966)(stating that the evidence must pertain to "any
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action").
279. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Right to 'Plead Out" Issues and Block the Admission
of Prejudicial Evidence: The Differential Treatment of Civil Litigants and the




sis by impliedly abolishing uncodified exclusionary rules of evi-
dence.280 Rule 403 completes the trilogy; that rule gives the trial
judge discretion to exclude relevant evidence only when the incidental
probative dangers substantially outweigh the probative worth of the
evidence. 281 Albert Jenner told Congress that the "thrust" of rules
such as Rule 403 was to "place the burden on he who seeks the exclu-
sion of relevant evidence."282 In its 1988 decision dealing with evi-
dence of an accused's uncharged crimes, 28 3 the Supreme Court read
the legislative history of still another Article IV statute, Rule 404, as
manifesting an intent "to 'plac[e] greater emphasis on admissibility
' "284
The same bias favoring the admission of relevant evidence spills
over into Article VI. The first sentence of Rule 601 sets the tone for
the article by announcing that "[e]very person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules."285 Congress ap-
proved the rule's first sentence without the slightest change even
though the accompanying Advisory Committee Note avowed the revo-
lutionary intent to "eliminate[ ] all grounds of incompetency not
specifically recognized in the succeeding rules of this Article."286 Rule
608 broadened the admissibility of impeaching evidence of a witness'
untruthfulness by permitting the admission of opinion as well as repu-
tation testimony.28 7 For its part, Rule 613 relaxed the standards
for the introduction of evidence of a witness' prior inconsistent
statements.288
In the same vein, Article VII dealing with opinion testimony mir-
rors a greater stress on the admissibility of relevant, reliable evidence.
In its celebrated 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc.,289 the Supreme Court not only held that Rule 702 over-
280. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793-94 (1993);
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach to the
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV. 267 (1993); Ed-
ward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6
REV. LITIG. 129 (1987).
281. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRID, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 8:28, at 278
(Cum. Supp. 1994)(discussing the Advisory Committee Note which accompanied
the 1990 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and which clarified the
meaning of Rule 403); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30
VnuL. L. REV. 1465, 1474-79 (1985).
282. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 87 (statement of Albert E. Jenner, Jr.).
283. United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
284. Id. at 688.
285. FED. R. Evm. 601.
286. Id. at advisory committee's note.
287. EDWARD J. MWINKELRIED, ET AL., CouRTRooM CRnmNAL EVIDENCE § 707, at 186-
87 (2d ed. 1993).
288. Id. § 711, at 201-04.
289. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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turned the traditional, conservative general acceptance test for the
introduction of scientific evidence; the Court also highlighted "the 'lib-
eral thrust' of the Federal Rules" and "the Rules' permissive" charac-
ter.290 Rule 703 also lowers barriers to the admission of relevant
expert testimony. At early common law, an expert generally had to
have personal, firsthand knowledge of the facts in the case which she
was asked to evaluate; the only other option was to invite the expert to
opine based on a hypothetical question and introduce independent evi-
dence to prove up every element of the hypothesis.291 Rule 703 re-
formed that practice by allowing the expert to rely on hearsay reports
when it is the customary practice of her specialty to do s0.292 Lastly,
Rule 704 laid to rest the ultimate fact prohibition which sometimes
blocked the introduction of otherwise admissible opinions.293
Like Articles IV, VI, and VII, Article VIII evidences greater recep-
tivity to relevant, trustworthy testimony, in this case, hearsay. It was
in an Article VIII case, Beach Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,294 that the
Court initially characterized the Federal Rules as having a "liberal
thrust."295 In the same opinion, the Court alluded to the Rules' "gen-
eral approach of relaxing the traditional barriers" to the admission of
relevant evidence.296 Article V1Trs provisions codify several hearsay
exceptions which were distinct minority doctrines at common law.297
Furthermore, Article VIII liberalized the scope of some exceptions
which had won common-law recognition.298
A relevance bias is likewise implicit in Article IX of the Federal
Rules. At common law, many jurisdictions imposed special, rigid re-
strictions on the authentication of certain types of evidence such as
290. Id. at 2794. See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision: Frye Is
Dead, Long Live the Federal Rules of Evidence, TRiAL, Sept. 1993, at 60 (explain-
ing the early history, decision, and denouncement of Daubert).
291. 1 PAUL C. GImNNELLi & EDWARD J. I1WHINKELRED, ScImNTIc EVIDEmNCE § 5-5, at
145-46 (2d ed. 1993).
292. Id. § 5-5(C), at 148-155.
293. Id. § 5-7, at 156-59.
294. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
295. Id. at 169.
296. Id.
297. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of the Memory Factor in Analyzing
the Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt-and Quickly For-
gotten, 41 FLA. L. Rv. 215, 231-32 (1989)(discussing the present sense impres-
sion exception set out in Federal Rule 803(1)); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use
of Learned Scientific Treatises Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18), TRIAL
Feb. 1982, at 56, 56.
298. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988)(construing FED. R. EvID.
803(8) codifying the official record exception); IMWINKELRD, supra note 287,
§§ 1213, 1309, at 327, 371-75 (discussing the expansion of the state of mind and
dying declaration exceptions).
1994]
540 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:511
tape recordings.299 Out of a fear of tampering, these courts demanded
"extraordinarily detailed foundations."300 In contrast, Rule 901(a)
states a minimal authentication standard; the test is merely whether
the proponent has introduced "evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."3ol The Fed-
eral Rules hence overturn these common-law restrictions.30 2
Article X, codifying the best evidence rule, fits the same liberal
mold. The Federal Rules loosened several of the strictures of the com-
mon-law best evidence rule. For instance, they expanded the defini-
tion of both "original"303 and "duplicate."30 4 Even if the proffered
evidence does not fall within either definition, it may be easier to in-
troduce secondary evidence; Article X codifies broad versions of sev-
eral of the excuses for non-production. For example, Rule 1005
codifies an especially broad version of the excuse that the original
writing is in official custody.305 Rule 1005 applies to private "docu-
ment[s] authorized to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or
filed"306 in addition to government documents.
In summary, as one of the witnesses in the Senate hearings
testified, the Federal Rules display a definite "bias' in favor
of admissibility."307 That bias is "[p]erhaps the predominant
theme"308 of the statutory framework. The pattern in Articles IV
and VI through X is unmistakable. The content of those articles
bespeaks the twin assumptions that the primary objective of the
judicial system is accurate factfindingO9 and that for the most
299. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution,
supra note 280, at 143.
300. Id.
301. FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
302. United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1174 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 938
(1991); United States v. Santana, 898 F.2d 821, 824 (1st Cir. 1990); People v.
Berkey, 467 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. 1991); Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402:
The Second Revolution, supra note 279, at 143.
303. hIMNLRIED, supra note 287, § 1505, at 429-30.
304. Id. § 1506, at 430-32.
305. Id. § 1515, at 437-38.
306. FED. R. EvLD. 1005.
307. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 246.
308. Id.
309. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)(stating "the normally predomi-
nant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."); In re Din-
nan, 661 F.2d 426, 427 (5th Cir.) ("The basis of justice is truth and our system
frowns upon impediments to ascertaining that truth."), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1106 (1981); WuGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6 § 5422, at 209 n.64 (1993
Supp.)(citing In re International Horizons, Inc., 689 F.2d 996, 1005 (11th Cir.
1982)("Truth is might above all things."); id. at 677 (stating the Progressive ideal
that "the truth comes first"). But see WEINSTEiN & BERGER, supra note 7, 9
501[01], at 501-15 to 16 ("Numerous comments questioned the Advisory Commit-
tee's basic assumption that the goal of judicial truth-finding is superior to the
extrinsic social values served by privileges.").
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part,3 10 the admission of relevant, reliable evidence furthers that ob-
jective. Those assumptions should influence the manner in which the
courts exercise their power under Rule 501.
C. The Contextual Synthesis
As section 1.B demonstrated, the most realistic assessment of the
text and legislative history of Rule 501 is that for political reasons,
Congress chose not to reach the merits of the question of whether the
courts should be receptive or hostile to privilege claims. Rather, Con-
gress adopted a political compromise. In Rule 501 itself, Congress
prescribed only a methodology for the courts to use to answer the
question; Congress codified the common-law principle3ll that a court
should evaluate a privilege claim by balancing the loss of probative
evidence against the extrinsic values fostered by privileges.312 In
Trammel3 1 3 in 1980, the Court had to determine the extent to which
Rule 501 furnishes privilege protection for the marital relationship.
To make that determination, the Court resorted to classic common-
law methodology and explicitly applied a balancing test.3 14
Although Rule 501 furnishes the procedural methodology for adju-
dicating privilege claims, its context-the other articles of the Federal
Rules-supplies a substantive policy bias favoring the admission of
relevant, reliable evidence. The invocation of a privilege can bar the
introduction of such evidence, and the loss of that evidence is the so-
cial cost of recognizing the privilege. The Federal Rules of Evidence
have a built-in bias against that type of loss. As has been shown, how-
ever, that bias does not derive from the legislative history of Rule 501
itself; rather, it emanates from Rule 501's neighbors, Articles IV and
VI through X. Rule 501 in effect requires the judge to weigh the com-
peting interests on a scale; but Congress has placed a thumb on the
relevance side of the scale and tipped it in favor of the admission of
probative evidence.
In several cases, the Supreme Court has implicitly adopted this
reasoning. In one passage in Trammel, the Court indicated that Rule
310. Of course, it is facile to assume that the introduction of additional evidence al-
ways promotes that objective. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., "There'll Always Be
an England": The Instrumental Ideology of Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1204,
1211 (1987). Some evidence comes attended by serious probative dangers that
the jury will misuse the evidence and impede the search for truth. In effect, Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403 is an attempt to identify the point of diminishing re-
turns-the point at which the 'admission of additional evidence runs counter to
the objective.
311. FED. R. Evm. 501.
312. Senate Hearing, supra note 1, at 308 (citing "the proper balance").
313. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
314. Id. at 51.
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501 was the controlling provision of the Federal Rules.315 However, in
another passage-without citing any Rule 501 legislative history-
the Court declared that privileges must be strictly construed and ac-
cepted "only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to
testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending
the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth."316 A decade later in its 1990 decision, University
of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,3 7
the Court stated that "we are disinclined to exercise" the Rule 501
"authority expansively."3 1 8 As in Trammel, the Court did not cite any
Rule 501 legislative history discouraging the courts from expansively
exercising Rule 501 powers. The point is that there is no such history.
In Rule 501 itself, Congress adopted a neutral stance on the substan-
tive policy question. However, perhaps instinctively, the Court has
appreciated that there is a policy bias, originating from the context of
Rule 501.
This position is an Hegelian synthesis. The proponents of the ex-
pansive view are partially right. Congress did not freeze federal privi-
lege law. Rule 501 does not preclude the recognition of novel
privileges, and its legislative history lacks a clear manifestation of
congressional intention to even discourage recognition of such claims.
However, the advocates of the restrictive view are partially right. To
be sure, it would be wrong-minded for the courts to embrace the ex-
treme restrictive view foreclosing new privilege claims. However, the
advocates of the more moderate restrictive view are correct; there is a
substantive policy bias against fashioning new privileges. They are
right, though, for the wrong reason. While they strain to find that
policy bias in the history of Rule 501, the policy has another, different
source, the context of Rule 501.
III. CONCLUSION
To a greater extent than most philosophers, Georg Hegel was con-
cerned with history.31 9 He had written, for example, that although he
greatly admired Plato's work, in Hegel's day history made it impossi-
ble to be a Platonist.320 The most epochal events of Hegel's time-the
collapse of the French Revolution and the advent of "heavy-handed"
tyrannies in its wake32 -- had convinced him that history could be a
315. Id. at 47.
316. Id. at 50 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)).
317. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
318. Id. at 189.
319. 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 55, at 436.
320. Id.
321. CAsTELL, supra note 55, at 451-52.
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"slaughter bench,"322 and his own painful, personal experience rein-
forced that conviction.3 23 As a consequence of his interest in history,
Hegel would probably have found it appropriate to apply his dialecti-
cal method324 to evaluate the history of Rule 501. The application of
that method yields synthesis detailed in section 1.C. Construing Rule
501 in the context of the policy bias implicit in Articles IV and VI
through X, the federal courts should exercise caution in adjudicating
privilege claims.
This cautionary note does not sound a death-knell for privileges in
general or even for novel privileges in particular. The most funda-
mental common-law principle325 codified in Rule 501 is that the courts
must determine privilege claims by the method of balancing the loss of
probative evidence against the social value of the extrinsic policies fos-
tered by the privilege.326 That principle does not authorize, much less
compel, the courts to disregard or depreciate the extrinsic social val-
ues which are the raison d'etre of privileges.
Those values fall into two broad categories. One category includes
instrumental or utilitarianjustifications for privileges.327 These justi-
fications argue that privileges should be recognized as a means to the
end of promoting certain types of out-of-court conduct such as candid
consultations between patients and their physicians and clients and
their attorneys. In the short term, the policy bias codified in the other
articles of the Federal Rules will make it difficult to construct a case
under Rule 501 that the courts should formulate new privileges based
on this type ofjustiflcation. A growing body of empirical research has
called into question the underlying assumption that the existence vel
non of privileges has a significant impact on the out-of-court behavior
of actors such as patients and clients.3 28
The very weakness of the instrumental justifications makes the
second category of extrinsic values all the more important. That cate-
gory of justification includes "humanistic" rationales which treat privi-
322. Id. at 460.
323. French soldiers invaded his home, and he had been rendered destitute. DuxRm,
supra note 54, at 294.
324. Id. at 443-46.
325. FED. R. Evm. 501.
326. 1 McCoimuci, EvDEN CE §§ 72, 77 (John W. Strong ed., 4th Practitioner's ed.
1992).
327. Id. § 77.
328. Daniel W. Shuman & Myron F. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Ex-
amination of the Pychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893 (1982);
Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv. 351 (1989); Note,
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implica-
tions for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
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leges as corollaries to the rights to privacy and personal autonomy.32 9
During the first set of House hearings, Professor Charles Black33o
wrote to the committee. In his letter, he highlighted the role which
privileges play in protecting citizens from "invasion of... human pri-
vacy."33 1 He argued that society's ethical sense of "decency" necessi-
tates the recognition of privileges. 3 32 In the long term, the federal
courts' gauge of that sense may shape the future of privileges. Rely-
ing, in the words of Rule 501, on their "reason" and "experience," indi-
vidual judges will have to assess the importance which American
society attaches to that extrinsic social value. That assessment will
enable the judge to adjust the Rule 501 balancing test to safeguard the
freedom of citizens from invasions of privacy.
As a German idealist,3 3 3 Hegel championed the freedom of the
mind.334 He not only personally prized that value; he thought that
one of the essential functions of the state was to guarantee that free-
dom.3 3 5 As a former theological seminary student,3 3 6 Hegel was com-
mitted to the ethical sense to which Professor Black appealed. Hegel
might well approve if the federal courts ultimately turn to such "ethi-
cal and moral considerations" 33 7 as the extrinsic values to balance and
protect under Rule 501.
329. WRmHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5425, at 710-11. See also LOuiSELL & MUEL-
LER, supra note 19, § 201, at 656-59 (discussing the value of individual privacy to
the spousal confidential communication privilege).
330. House Hearing I, supra note 22, at 240-44.
331. Id. at 242.
332. Id.
333. 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 55, at 435-36.
334. Id. at 436; CASTELL, supra note 55, at 456-57.
335. 3 THRE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PILOSOPHY, supra note 55, at 442; CAsTELL, supra note
55, at 463.
336. 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 55, at 435; DURNT, supra note
54, at 293.
337. LouisELL & MUELLER, supra note 19, § 210, at 656.
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